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Reptiles in the Weeds: Civil RICO vs. the First
Amendment in the Animal Rights Debate
"A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is
better revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of
countless freestanding trees."1
INTRODUCTION
Like many bouts of social protest, the 1966 boycott of white busi-
nesses in Claiborne County, Mississippi exhibited what Justice Stevens
called, "elements of criminality and elements of majesty."2 The boycott
was instituted by the NAACP and members of the Claiborne County
community in an effort to secure compliance with demands for racial
equality.' While the boycott primarily involved concerted and lawful
withholding of business by conscientious objectors, some participants
threatened violence and perpetrated physical attacks on the persons and
property of black community members who continued to patronize
targeted white businesses.4
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court refused to find the
entire boycotting community responsible for the acts of a few violent
individuals, despite the fact that the violence may have contributed to
the overall success of the boycott.5 The Court reasoned that a judgment
of "guilt for association" would be alien to the notion of a free society
and would violate the First Amendment.6 Instead, the Court held that
only individuals responsible for carrying out illegal actions and who
subsequently caused economic harm to the plaintiffs could be held
liable.7
It is unclear whether the holding in Claiborne Hardware still stands
to protect advocates for social change where the cause they promote is
marred by instances of illegal or violent conduct on the part of a few
individuals. This uncertainty has increased since the Racketeer-Influ-
enced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was held to apply to activist
1. NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982).
2. Id. at 888.
3. Id. at 889.
4. See id. at 903.
5. Id. at 933.
6. Id. at 931.
7. Id. at 933.
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groups with no profit-seeking motive in NOW v. Scheidler.8
RICO contains civil liability provisions that can subject political
activist groups to liability for treble damages and attorneys' fees in
potentially crippling sums. When Scheidler was decided, critics feared
that civil liability would become a tool used to stifle political activism in
arenas beyond the abortion context of that case, and would result in a net
decline in political organizing.9 These fears are beginning to material-
ize, as several RICO complaints have been filed in recent years against
animal rights activists by both fur retailers and laboratories that conduct
research on animals. 10
This Comment asserts that civil RICO liability violates First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association, and that until
the legislature tailors the statute more narrowly, protest movements -
which have helped shape American society since its inception - may
cease to be effective agents for debate and positive change. Part I will
analyze the ways in which activist movements have a net positive effect
on society, and will reveal that the law adequately protects businesses
from illegal protest activity without the constitutionally questionable use
of RICO. Part II will examine the origins and applications of RICO, and
will chart its evolution from a mechanism to counter the commercial
influence of organized crime to a mechanism for protecting monied
interests from the effects of protest activity. Part III will discuss the
makeup and tactics of the animal rights movement, and will reveal that
the facts underlying the animal rights lawsuits make Claiborne Hard-
ware, not NOW v. Scheidler, the controlling precedent. This part will
also look beyond the animal rights context, and will show that until a
First Amendment exception to civil RICO liability is created, either
through the statutory language or by court interpretation, the First
Amendment freedoms of association and political expression remain in
grave peril.
PART I. ACTIVIST MOVEMENTS PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN SHAPING
AMERICAN SOCIETY
For most of its history, this nation has afforded extraordinary pro-
8. 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Peter Burke, Application of RICO to Political Protest Activity: An Analogy to
the Antitrust Laws, 12 J. L. & POL. 573 (1996); Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the
Limit and Beyond, 45 DuKE L.J. 819 (1996); Brian J. Murray, Protesters, Extortion, and
Coercion: Preventing RICO From Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
691 (1999).
10. N.J. Furriers Pelt Protestors With Civil RICO Suit, Civil RICO Litig. Rep., Dec. 1999, at
3; Press Release, Huntingdon Sues Animal Activists (Apr. 19, 2001) available at http://www.
furcommission.com/news/newsF02t.htm.
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tection to political expression."1 This protection, however, has its limits.
There are numerous instances in American history where proponents of
change have gone beyond the law to make their message heard. For
purposes of this Comment, the value of lawful expression is considered
a given. What is at issue here is not the lawful holding of placards or
distribution of literature. Instead, this Comment examines the value of
those activities in conjunction with instances of concerted lawbreaking,
in the form of civil disobedience, and in conjunction with "direct
action," or unclaimed acts of vandalism undertaken for an ideological
purpose.
A. Civil Disobedience
There is much disagreement over the precise definition of the
phrase "civil disobedience." 2 Even the origins of the phrase are subject
to speculation. 3 This Comment adopts the restricted definition pro-
posed by Bruce Ledewitz, which conceives of civil disobedience as ille-
gal non-violent conduct where the actor participates openly, intending
that the community take notice of the action and that the action will
result in punishment. 4 This definition recognizes the fact that civil dis-
obedience inevitably involves some form of coercion, in that the target's
ordinary course of business will be disrupted and third parties will
unwittingly be affected. The definition also acknowledges that the dis-
tinction between coercion and violence is not absolute.' 5
Acts of civil disobedience, such as sit-ins and lock-downs,' 6 while
expressive, fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.' 7 Gener-
ally, civil disobedience is prosecuted under local trespass laws.' 8 Until
recently, state law has been thought to be adequate to protect citizens
11. "Our nation in a sense came into being through a massive act of civil disobedience, for the
Boston Tea Party was nothing but a massive act of civil disobedience." Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 217 (David R. Weber ed., 1978). Of Course, our American tradition of free speech is
blemished by historical embarrassments such as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Surely repeat
performances of such repression are to be avoided.
12. Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 67, 69 n.12 (1990).
13. Gandhi attributed the coinage of the phrase to Henry David Thoreau, but the phrase
appears nowhere in his writings, and his essay entitled "Civil Disobedience" was named in a
republishing of the work four years after his death. See CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, THEORY AND
PRACTICE 16 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969).
14. Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 70-81. A typical example is the sit-in.
15. Id. at 70.
16. A "lock-down" is a variation on the sit-in wherein participants occupy an area by locking
themselves to fixtures with devices such as bicycle U-locks to make removal by law enforcement
more difficult and to prolong the duration of the protest.
17. Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 67-68.
18. Id. at 68.
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from the inconvenience and potential economic loss that may result from
civil disobedience.
American society has a general tolerance for acts of civil disobedi-
ence. 9 Schoolchildren are taught to value the work of Henry David
Thoreau, Mohandas Gandhi, Susan B. Anthony, and Martin Luther
King, Jr., individuals who refused to cooperate with unjust laws. Of
course, the movements these individuals represent (civil rights, womens'
suffrage, national sovereignty, and non-violence), enjoy general support
today, but whether these movements would have been able to garner
such recognition and support had the tactic of civil disobedience not
been used is unknowable.
Critics of civil disobedience abound. Dr. King's assertion that
"there is a right to disobey an unjust law," was met with the criticism
that, "[i]f this philosophy were accepted and carried out by the twenty
million American Negroes, it would be enough to disorganize our entire
society and produce an intolerable chaos and a denial of individual lib-
erty to every other American." 2 This is perhaps a legitimate concern.
Yet, to date, no movement employing civil disobedience has disrupted
the orderly functioning of society on such a large scale. Again, the pre-
cise reason for this is not readily understood. It may be that movements
that are morally "right" succeed in winning significant support and their
ideals become integrated into law, while those philosophies which are
not "right," or that society is not willing to accept, remain confined to a
small enough minority that local laws prohibiting trespassing and
impeding traffic overpower occasional disobedience. Whatever the rea-
son, it is probably true that civil disobedience is justified at least some of
the time and is not likely to cause unacceptable harm.2'
B. Direct Action
While civil disobedience certainly has its critics, society is decid-
edly less tolerant of calculated acts of property destruction done for the
purpose of furthering an ideological goal. 2 These acts are referred to
herein as "direct action."2 3 The property destruction conceived of herein
19. Id. at 68 (quoting R. DWORKIN, A MArTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985)) ("Americans accept
that civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in the political culture of their
community.").
20. Louis Waldman, Civil Rights-Yes: Civil Disobedience-No (A Reply to Dr. Martin
Luther King), in CivrL DISOBEDIENCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 109 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969).
21. Ledewitz, supra note 12, at 82.
22. This is especially true in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
23. The term "direct action" is frequently used to describe acts of civil disobedience. This
Comment reserves the term direct action to refer to purposeful vandalism rather than to acts of
civil disobedience. Participants in civil disobedience seek the end result of arrest and publicity
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is limited to destruction of inanimate property with care taken to ensure
against harm to persons. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, this
country has experienced a new respect for adherence to law and a new
suspicion of ideology. One aim of this Comment is to remind readers of
historical examples of direct action such as the Boston Tea Party. The
Boston Tea Party is an example of direct action where participants dis-
guised their identities to evade capture and destroyed British tea in a
symbolic act of defiance. Modem-day direct action exhibits similar ele-
ments. Destruction of property is often characterized as "violence," and
our kneejerk reaction after Sept. 11 may be to agree with this characteri-
zation. Yet, we have a responsibility to remember the glaring difference
between the devastation of populated buildings and the throwing of tea
off ships. While there is a wide expanse of gray area between these
extremes, we must be cognizant of contextual variables when forming
opinions on instances of ideological property destruction. "Direct
action" as discussed here refers only to acts that are carefully carried out
to avoid human injury.
Participants in direct action ("direct activists") manifest varied
goals. Most hope their acts of vandalism will draw attention to the ill
they perceive in the status quo. One example of this type of direct
action was the 1984 break-in at the brain damage laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania by the Animal Liberation Front (A.L.F.), a
group that engages in direct action in support of animal rights.2 4 The
group removed forty-five hours of videotape that showed researchers
inflicting brain damage on conscious, unanesthetized baboons, and lift-
ing a baboon by a shoulder which they acknowledge was probably dislo-
cated.2 5  The tapes were widely distributed and prompted an
investigation by Congress that culminated in closure of the lab by the
Department of Health and Human Services. 6
Some direct activists inflict economic damage to dissuade a target
from engaging in what activists believe is a morally wrong act. A mod-
em-day example is the so-called "monkeywrenching" done by environ-
mental groups such as Earth First!, which encourages the spiking of
forest trees and the pouring of sand into the engines of bulldozers.27
while participants in direct action typically seek an end result of economic loss to the target and
usually try to avoid arrest.
24. GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 24 (1996).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. William W. Cason, Comment, Spiking the Spikers: The Use of Civil RICO Against
Environmental Terrorists, 35 Hous. L. REV. 745, 753 n.64 (1995). Tree spiking is the practice of
driving a railroad spike into a tree so that when it is felled the spike will destroy lumber
processing machinery.
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While presumably part of their motive is to draw attention to the prob-
lem of deforestation, the direct impact of their actions is economic loss
to the timber industry. There is a great deal of debate surrounding the
tactic of direct action in social movements, even among movement lead-
ers and constituents themselves. Critics speak of violence and "terror-
ism, '"28 while supporters make comparisons to heroic acts such as the
"theft" of slaves by abolitionists along the underground railroad, and
invoke the inquiry, "If not you, who? If not now, when?"'2 9
Supporters of direct action believe that the ends justify the means,
and that destruction of property is a lesser wrong than allowing that
property to continue to be used for a purpose that perpetuates a per-
ceived harm. The question of whether theft or destruction of property is
justifiable triggers a second question: What is property? The law now
recognizes that human beings are not property, but this was not always
the case. To the members of Earth First!, trees are not property, so tree
spiking in their view is justified. No harm befalls timber harvesters so
long as they do not take what activists believe is not theirs to take. Yet,
most people and the law recognize that trees indeed can be property.
Most believe that the alteration of trees to destroy machinery, and per-
haps injure workers, is not justifiable. Thus, it seems to follow that
direct action can perhaps be justified in retrospect, after a movement has
succeeded in persuading a critical mass of supporters. Few Americans
today would condemn Harriet Tubman or the participants in the Boston
Tea Party for their illegal acts of trespass and interference with property.
This discussion does not mean to imply that because what is con-
sidered "justified" changes over time that we as a society should turn the
other cheek to direct action. Indeed, what is illegal should be prose-
cuted. This Comment merely suggests that criminal law, without civil
RICO liability for non-violent movement adherents, is sufficient to com-
bat ideologically motivated crime.
PART II: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF Rico
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA) was created to
deal with an increase in organized crime, or racketeering, and to stop it
from infiltrating legitimate industry.30 Title IX of OCCA is known as
28. Id. at 745.
29. See Animal Liberation Frontline Information Service, at http://www.animalliberation.net
(last checked Mar. 6, 2001).
30. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), was
prefaced with the following "Statement of Finding and Purpose":
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
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the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.3" OCCA was
deliberately drafted with broad language to allow law enforcement to
build cases against evasive and powerful perpetrators of organized
crime.12 Its goal was to halt the proliferation of organized crime "by
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by estab-
lishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities [of those engaged] in
organized crime.
Unlike the rest of OCCA, RICO itself does not mention "organized
crime. ' '"' Rather than focusing on a class of perpetrators, RICO lists
types of prohibited activities that apply to any actor engaging in those
activities.35 RICO provides for both civil and criminal remedies, and
allows private plaintiffs to recover treble damages and attorneys' fees.36
This Comment deals mainly with the civil component of RICO because
that is the arm used against the pro-lifers in NOW v. Scheidler and
against the animal rights activists in the pending district court cases dis-
cussed infra. It is important to note, however, that the criticisms herein
regarding RICO's First Amendment implications apply equally to the
criminal arm of RICO should the government begin to utilize it to prose-
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this
money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business
and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate foreign commerce, threaten the domestic
security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5)
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering
process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
32. Bryan W. Riley, RICO Economic Motive Unnecessary for the Proof of an Enterprise:
National Organization of Women v. Scheidler, 17 U. ARK. Lrr-E ROCK L. REV. 343, 345 (1995).
33. Jennifer Bullock, National Organization for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and the
Economic Motive Requirement, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (1994) (quoting "Statement of
Findings and Purpose of OCCA").
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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cute political protestors.37
A. "Racketeering" Activity
The types of activities prohibited by RICO are those that inflict
injury to business or property by a defendant: (1) investing income
derived from racketeering activity in the establishment or operation of
an enterprise; (2) acquiring or maintaining interest or control of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) conducting the affairs
of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; or (4) conspir-
ing to commit any of the preceding three acts.38 To prove allegations
under RICO, a plaintiff must show the existence of an "enterprise," and
a "pattern" of "racketeering activity."'39 These requirements are inten-
tionally broadly stated and their definitions open-ended.4° Further, these
uncertain terms are subject to the requirement that RICO "be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. '"41
RICO provides a list of predicate acts that can satisfy the "racke-
teering activity" requirement, including: "any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or deal-
ing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year .... "'
The Act also defines as "racketeering activity" violations of the Hobbs
Act, which prohibits interference with commerce through robbery or
extortion.43 Plaintiffs most frequently use Hobbs Act extortion as the
predicate offense when using RICO against protestors.'
B. "Pattern" Requirement
RICO's required "pattern" of racketeering activity need only com-
prise a minimum of two predicate acts committed within ten years of
each other.45 To constitute a pattern, the alleged predicate acts must
37. The Scheidler opinion impacts both civil and criminal applications of RICO since the
enterprise element is the same for both. See Riley, supra note 32, at 345.
38. Riley, supra note 32, at 345-46 (paraphrasing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(d) (1994)).
39. Id. at 346.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947
(1970)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (2000).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (2000). The Hobbs Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. section 1951(a)
(2000). It defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
Id. § 195 1(b)(2).
44. Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819, 820
(1996).
45. "'Pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which had to occur after the effective date of this chapter [October 15, 1970] and the last of which
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exhibit relatedness and continuity of activity.46 That is, a similar pur-
pose for the predicate acts must be evident (relatedness) and it must be
shown that the illegal acts occurred continuously within a specified time
period or that the acts were threatened to continue into the future (con-
tinuity of activity).47
C. "Enterprise" Requirement
The term "enterprise" has been interpreted by courts in an increas-
ingly broad manner. It is explicitly defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) as
"including any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union of group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."'48 The circuit courts have generally under-
stood RICO's use of the term "enterprise" to encompass three elements.
The first is that individuals involved in the enterprise work toward a
common purpose.4 9 Second, there must be an ongoing organization and
structure forming the enterprise. The enterprise may make decisions
hierarchically or consensually, but they must be made in a manner that is
more than merely ad hoc.5 0 This organizational element also requires
that there be some degree of continuity of personnel forming the enter-
prise such that the organization has a discernible structure over time.5
The final element is the enterprise's "existence beyond that which is
necessary merely to commit each of the acts charged as predicate racke-
teering offenses."52 That is, a RICO enterprise must be more than a
mere conspiracy to commit a predicate offense, and must be more like
an ongoing planning body which carries out predicate offenses over
time. 3
D. The Circuit Court Split Over Economic Motive
Until NOW v. Scheidler, most circuit courts imputed an economic
motive to the definition of "enterprise. ' 54 The Eighth Circuit, for exam-
must occur within ten years (excluding period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior
act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) (2000). This provision is subject to the statute of
limitations. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2000).
46. Riley, supra note 32, at 348 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
239 (1989)).
47. Id. (citing Northwestern Bell TeL Co., 492 U.S. at 239, 240).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
49. Parker, supra note 44, at 837 (citing United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th
Cir. 1982)).
50. Id. (citing United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1983)).
51. Lemm, 860 F.2d at 1199.
52. Parker, supra note 44, at 837-38 (citing Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 224).
53. Id. at 838.
54. Id.
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pie, stated, "for purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed toward
an economic goal."55 The Third Circuit, however, reached the opposite
conclusion when it held that because the predicate offense does not
require economic motive, RICO requires no additional economic
motive.56 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Scheidler to resolve the controversy over the reach of RICO where no
economic motive is apparent on the part of defendants."
E. An Unprecedented Interpretation of RICO: NOW v. Scheidler
In 1986, frustrated by an increasingly intrusive pro-life presence at
women's health clinics, the National Organization for Women joined
forces with the Delaware Women's Health Organization and the Summit
Women's Health Organization to bring suit against Joseph Scheidler and
the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), among other pro-life defend-
ants.58 Their complaints, filed in the Northern District of Illinois,
alleged violations of both RICO and the Sherman Act.59 The plaintiffs
requested injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorneys' fees and
costs.
6 0
The complaints alleged that the defendant pro-life activists had
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to halt the operation of
abortion clinics. 61 The predicate act alleged was Hobbs Act extortion, in
conjunction with alleged violations of the Sherman Act62 arising from
the establishment of competing pregnancy testing and counseling cen-
ters,63 and several state claims alleging trespass, physical blockade,
property destruction, and interference with patient appointments by
tying up clinic phone lines and making false appointments. 64 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the activists used threats and intimidation tactics to
dissuade patients from having abortions and to dissuade facility employ-
ees from pursuing careers facilitating abortion. The plaintiffs' claims
were dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. 65 The district court found the Sherman Act inap-
plicable because the alleged anticompetitive activities were politically,
not commercially motivated, thus shielding them from Sherman Act
55. Id. (quoting United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988)).
56. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350 (3d Cir. 1989).
57. NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994).
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
63. NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 938 (N.D. II1. 1991).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 941.
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liability.66
The court also dismissed the RICO claims on three grounds. The
plaintiffs' RICO claims were based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962(a), (c), and (d). The § 1962(a) claim, that the activists were
investing income received through racketeering activity in the establish-
ment or operation of an enterprise, 67 was dismissed because the defend-
ants' "income" was generated through donor contributions and the court
did not consider contributions campaigns to be a pattern of racketeering
activity. 68 The § 1962(c) claims (conducting the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity)69 were dismissed because the
court read this section to require an economic motivation on the part of
the alleged enterprise, and the plaintiffs claimed no economic motiva-
tion.7" Finally, the § 1962(d) claim, alleging conspiracy to commit any
other RICO claim, was dismissed because the other RICO claims were
dismissed.7'
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the
district court's ruling that both RICO and the Sherman Act require an
economic motive not held by political actors.7 2 The circuit court deter-
mined that Congress did not intend for RICO to apply to political
actors.73 While cognizant of the mandate that RICO be applied broadly,
the court read a requirement of an economic motive in the wording of
the statute that prevented it from ruling for the plaintiffs.74 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the donations were not the proceeds of racketeering
because the relationship between the defendants' activities at abortion
clinics and their receipt of donations was too tenuous. 75
F. The Supreme Court Finds No Economic Motive Requirement
in RICO
After a request for a rehearing en banc was denied,76 the plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court.7 7 They claimed that summary judgment
in the defendants' favor was improper because no economic motive was
66. Burke, supra note 9, at 598 n.102 (citing Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
68. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 941.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
70. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. at 944.
71. Id.
72. NOW v. Scheidler, 986 F.2d 612, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. Id. at 617-23.
74. Id. at 629.
75. Burke, supra note 9, at 589 n.109.
76. NOW v. Scheidler, No. 91-2468, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17686 *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 4,
1992).
77. NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
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required to prevail under RICO. The only issue before the Supreme
Court was whether RICO required that defendants have an economic
motive. No First Amendment defense was raised. Respondents simply
countered that an economic motive was implied in the RICO statute, and
that even if it was not, the protestors' activities could not be construed as
extortion.
The unanimous opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held
that RICO contained no economic motive requirement, thereby revers-
ing the decision of the Seventh Circuit.78 The Court looked directly to
the language of the statute to render its decision.79 Instead of a required
economic motive, the Court found that the enterprise needs merely to
affect interstate commerce.8" The Court did not consider whether extor-
tion had in fact occurred, nor did it address whether RICO liability could
violate the First Amendment when used against protestors.81
G. First Amendment Concerns Mentioned in Concurrence
Justices Souter and Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but wrote
separately to address the First Amendment concerns voiced by numer-
ous amici.82 The amici believed that the requirement of an economic
motivation would be necessary to protect free speech rights. The Justices
responded to pleas that the Court construe RICO to require an economic
motivation to avoid potential violations of the First Amendment where
RICO is used against protest organizations.83 They disagreed with amici
because they believed that such a requirement "would protect too much
with respect to First Amendment interests, since it would keep RICO
from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of vio-
lence we need not fear chilling."84 The Justices also believed that the
requirement might not provide as much protection as amici believed,
because all protest groups might not be entirely without economic moti-
vations, "for even protest movements need money."85 Finally, the con-
currence advised that "nothing in the Court's opinion precludes a RICO
defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a particular
case," and that even where RICO predicate acts are present, a defendant
may be entitled to a dismissal based on a finding that the predicate acts
78. Id. at 262.
79. Id. at 258-59.
80. Id. at 257-58.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 263. Amicus briefs were filed for: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,
Inc., the Ohio Right to Life Society, the Southern Center for Law and Ethics, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and Focus on the Family. Id. at 251.
83. Id. at 263.
84. Id. at 264.
85. Id.
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are "fully protected First Amendment activity."86
Protest groups who take solace in the Scheidler concurrence are
misguided. The concurrence does not announce a safe haven for protes-
tors in the First Amendment. Instead, it invites litigants to test the judi-
cial waters with regard to just how much speech can be restrained
through characterization of speech activity as "violence" and
racketeering.
PART III. RICO SUITS AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS: THE
BEGINNING OF THE END OF PROTEST
The NOW v. Scheidler decision prompted a flood of discussion on
the propriety of the decision and the potential for use and abuse of RICO
in the context of protest activity.87 The use of RICO against animal
activists was widely predicted.88 In fact, People for the Ethical Treat-
ment of Animals (PETA) filed an amicus brief in Scheidler in which the
group argued against reversal. 89
The first RICO suit against animal rights protestors was filed in
May of 1999 under the name Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman.9° The
case was the first use of RICO against protestors outside the abortion
context. 91 The fur retailer's location in Center City, Philadelphia had
been the target of protests on an almost weekly basis since 1995. The
complaint named three animal rights groups and four individuals as
defendants. 92 The individuals were between the ages of seventeen and
twenty-one years of age.93
The complaint alleged that the activists set out "to ultimately force
Ferber out of business" '94 and listed "twelve examples of [the activists']
86. Id. at 268.
87. See, e.g., Suzanne Wentzel, NOW v. Scheidler: RICO a Valuable Tool for Controlling
Violent Protest, 28 AKRON L. REV. 391 (1995); Carole Golinski, In Protest of NOW v. Scheidler,
46 ALA. L. REV. 163 (1994); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson
From the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853 (1999); Tracy S. Craige, Note, Abortion Protest:
Lawless Conspiracy or Protected Free Speech?, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 445 (1995).
88. See, e.g., Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J.
819, 848 (1996).
89. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 251.
90. Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman, No. 99-CV-2277 (E.D. Pa., filed May 5, 1999); Shannon
P. Duffy, Phila. Furrier Files Civil RICO Suit, Claims Protesters Have Gone Too Far, Legal
Intelligencer, May 5, 1999, at 1.
91. Duffy, supra note 90, at 1.
92. The groups include in the complaint were the Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade, the
Animal Defense League, and Vegan Resistance for Liberation. Id.
93. Interview with Brett Wyker, defendant in Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman, Pompano
Beach, Florida (Jan. 30, 2001).
94. Duffy, supra note 90, at 1.
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alleged illegal and harassing conduct."95 The allegations included three
instances of paint thrown on the store's doorway, two instances of "for-
cible entry" into the showroom, three instances of the store's large plate
glass window being "etched" with anti-fur messages, and three instances
of the store's door being glued shut.9 6 The complaint also charged the
activists with posting anti-fur stickers on the storefront and adjacent
buildings 97 and with affixing posters to public property that contained
the image of company president Kenneth Ferber and the message,
"Wanted for Murder, Considered Extremely Violent."98 The activists
were further accused of threatening store employees with violence. 99
It is notable that none of the named defendants was criminally
charged with perpetrating the alleged vandalism or harassment." ° After
the suit was filed, in late 1999, twenty-year-old defendant Joseph Bate-
man was arrested on a warrant for allegedly breaking the window at
Jacques Ferber Furs by pounding on the window during the course of a
protest.' 0 ' Pennsylvania later dropped the charges when Bateman's
claim of innocence survived two polygraphs. 0 2
Furriers in New Jersey filed a second RICO suit against animal
rights activists three months after Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman.10 3
The plaintiffs in the New Jersey case are fur retailers who allege that
activists have harassed customers, vandalized their property, and ille-
gally blocked entry to their stores."0 4 The furriers claim that the actions
of the anti-fur groups have forced them "to protect against the frequent
protest activities," and they claim that these protective measures have
caused them considerable financial hardship.10 5
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Note that the posting of signs and posters on public property is considered classic or
"pure" speech that is virtually always protected by the First Amendment. Arlington County
Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587, 593 (4th Cir. 1993).
99. Duffy, supra note 90, at 1.
100. Interview with Brett Wyker, defendant in Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman, Pompano
Beach, Florida (Jan. 30, 2001).
101. Telephone interview with Joseph Bateman, defendant in Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman
(Feb. 6, 2001).
102. Bateman's alibi, that he was not even present at the protest on the day in question, was
supported by his polygraph results. Id.
103. Winters Fur Shoppe, Inc. v. Fullmer, No. 99-CV-3583 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 15, 1999).
104. NJ Furriers Pelt Protestors With Civil RICO Suit, CIVIL RICO LITI. REP., Dec. 1999, at
3. Note that "harassment" is frequently in the eye (or ear) of the beholder. The chanting of anti-
fur message may seem like harassment to a furrier, but to most, and most likely to a competent
court, it would be deemed pure First Amendment activity.
105. New Jersey Furriers File 'Cross the Line' Suit Against Animal Rights Activists, CIVIL
RICO LrING. REP., Sept. 15, 1999. Query whether any single action undertaken to "protect
against" protest activity has been as effective or as expensive as the filing of the lawsuit at issue.
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Prior to these suits, in 1997, a pharmaceutical testing laboratory
called Huntingdon Life Sciences instituted a RICO action against People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals after an agent of the group covertly
videotaped abuse at the laboratory and released the video to the news
media, which aired scenes of flagrant animal abuse on national televi-
sion. t°6 The suit was different from the suits filed by the furriers in that
it was filed against a single organization, PETA, for the actions of one of
its agents in videotaping and releasing footage. The suit did not involve
protest activity as that term is understood here. The parties ultimately
settled, but Huntingdon later followed the lead of the furriers and filed
another RICO suit in April, 2001 against several groups who continued
to respond to Huntingdon's ongoing pattern of animal welfare viola-
tions. ' 7 Four undercover investigations over the last five years have
revealed horrific abuse such as Huntingdon workers punching beagle
dogs in the face at one of the company's British labs.108 Activists have
staged massive rallies such as one held October 29, 2001 in Little Rock,
Arkansas to protest the making of a life-saving loan to the financially
strapped Huntingdon by its major investor, Stephens, Inc.' 09 Activists
have also held protests at the homes of Huntingdon and Stephens
employees. ' 10
The Huntingdon Life Sciences lawsuit, filed in the Federal District
of New Jersey, requests an injunction preventing activists from engaging
in "acts and threats of force, violence and intimidation" directed at the
Company, its investors, and their respective employees, customers, and
shareholders.'1 I It also seeks damages for losses the company alleges it
incurred as a result of the defendants' activities. 1 2 The defendants
include Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, Voices for Animals, Animal
Defense League, In Defense of Animals, and several individuals. 1 3 A
106. See Hearings on the Civil RICO Clarification Act of 1990 Before the House Subcomm. On
Crime of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3-8 (1998) (statement of Jeffrey S. Kerr, PETA
General Counsel), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/35055.htm.
107. Huntingdon has been exposed for its flagrant disregard for animal welfare in four
undercover investigations since 1997. Workers have been videotaped abusing drugs and alcohol
on the job, performing crude operations on alert, unanesthetized animals, and failing to notice that
a monkey was in fact alive before commencing a necropsy. See Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty,
at http://www.october29.org/shacusa/inside-michelle.htm (last checked Dec. 29, 2001) (copy of
file with author).
108. 029: Business as Usual?, SHAC USA NEWSLEtTER (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
USA, Phila., PA), Winter 2001, at 5.
109. Id.
110. News Briefs, SHAC USA Newsletter (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Phila.,
PA), Winter 2001, at 12.
111. Press Release, Huntingdon Life Sciences, Huntingdon Sues Animal Activists (Apr. 19,
2001), at http://www.furcomission.com/news/newsF02t.htm (last checked Dec. 29, 2001).
112. Id.
113. Id. It is telling that fur trade groups are paying close attention to a lawsuit filed by a
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spokesperson for Huntingdon boldly stated, "[tihis lawsuit states
unequivocally that no one has the right to replace dialogue and debate
with extortion and terrorism.""' 4 One must wonder whether the suit
itself is an act of extortion, and whether these attempts to combat "ter-
rorism" by elusive perpetrators in fact target those engaged in nothing
more than dialogue and debate.
A. The Myriad Tactics and Organizational Philosophies Within the
Animal Rights Movement
"Animal Rights" is a generic label attached to diverse philoso-
phies.115 In contrast to some other social movements, it lacks a single,
overarching objective. Many scholars have asked, what does it mean to
give animals "rights?"'"16  If society comes to believe that animals
should have rights, what rights should they have?" 7 Would rights for
animals mean all animals, including cockroaches, or would rights be
awarded selectively? How would rights eligibility criteria be deter-
mined? The philosophy of animal rights provides no clear answers and
individual adherents have differing responses to the many questions
raised by the concept of "animal rights."
Similarly, there is no clear consensus among proponents of animal
rights as to what tactics best promote the cause. Animal welfare efforts,
such as campaigning for bigger cages on factory farms, are undertaken
by many groups who would prefer to ban factory farms altogether, but
who choose to go after more readily attainable piecemeal reform." 8
pharmaceutical testing firm. It seems that there is coordination or at least a sense of solidarity
among all of those inconvenienced by the actions of animal rights activists.
114. Id.
115. "[T]he phrase, which both activists and their detractors tend to use, is imprecise." Vance
Lehmkuhl, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, PHILA. CITY PAPER, Sept. 7-
14, 2000, at 21 (book review). A common misconception is that all advocates for animals are
advocates of animal "rights." In fact, most opponents of animal abuse subscribe to a conception
of animal welfare. Animal welfarists advocate better treatment of animals by humans, but do not
challenge the basic assumption that the use of animals for human benefits is justified. See, e.g.,
Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad, 43
BUFF. L. REv. 765, 768 (1995). In contrast, animal rights advocates believe that animals are not
merely resources to be exploited for human ends and that the use of animals by humans should
cease entirely. Id. at 772.
116. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF
ANIMALS (1975); ROBERT GARNER, ANIMALS, POLITICS, AND MORALITY (1993); ANIMAL RIGHTS
AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (Tom Regan & Peter Singer eds., 1976); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).
117. "[M]ost people hear 'animal rights' and think of animals driving, animals voting, animals
bringing lawsuits. No. I'm talking about one right: not to be property. That's all." Lehmkuhl,
supra note 115, at 21 (quoting Gary L. Francione).
118. This tactic resulted in success for PETA in its campaign for improved treatment of farm
animals by suppliers to McDonald's. Press Release, People for Ethical Treatment of Animals,
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Other individuals and groups denounce piecemeal reform because they
believe that it hinders real progress toward abolition of the use of ani-
mals for human ends.119
PETA, the group most widely identified as representing the animal
rights movement, is probably the group whose tactics are most criticized
by animal rights activists themselves. 120  The group has repeatedly
employed the use of shock tactics, such as its use of a picture of former
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani on an anti-milk billboard with
the message, "Got Prostate Cancer?" The response of many animal
activists and groups has been to refuse to work with PETA on
campaigns. '21
Another point of contention regarding movement tactics concerns
the propriety of illegal activity for the purpose of advancing the cause of
animal rights. Most animal rights groups support the use of illegal sit-
ins to attract attention to animal rights causes. 122 Less widely accepted
among movement adherents is the illegal breaking and entering of facili-
ties such as laboratories for the purpose of removing animals or evi-
dence of animal abuse, and the unlawful destruction of property of
businesses targeted by activists.12 3 Many groups, however, avidly sup-
port these types of actions, but do not openly advocate them. PETA is
one such group. It places dates of significant past "raids" against animal
abusers on its yearly calendar sent to members.
The identities of the perpetrators of direct action for animal rights
are kept relatively well-hidden. Most instances of direct action are
claimed by the Animal Liberation Front (A.L.F.) which allows any per-
petrator of direct action to use its name, so long as s/he conforms to
broad guidelines. 2 4 The guidelines are published on the "Animal Liber-
World's Largest Animal Rights Group Offers Assistance to World's Largest Buyer of Beef (Dec.
7, 2000), at http://www.peta.com/news/1200/1200mcveggie.html.
119. The figure most visibly associated with this position is Gary L. Francione, professor of
law at Rutgers University. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996); see also Lehmkuhl, supra note 115, at 21 ("Compromise
to Gary [Francione] means eliminating an entire class of activity, whereas others are more willing
to work for animal welfare.").
120. See Lehmkuhl, supra note 115, at 21 (quoting Gary L. Francione) ("I don't believe
[PETA] should use morally problematic means to get to whatever ends [they] want to get to.
That's exactly why ... a lot of forms of animal exploitation are bad.").
121. Telephone Interview with John Goodwin, former Director of Coalition to Abolish the Fur
Trade (Nov. 30, 2001).
122. Id.
123. Id. Many prominent figures in the animal rights movement are vehemently opposed to
direct action such as that done by the A.L.F. See, e.g., Animal People, A.L.F. Raids Kill Animals,
Aug./Sept. 1996, available at http://www.animalpeoplenews.org/ALFRaids.html (a commentary
by the publisher of Animal People magazine, Merritt Clifton) (on file with author).
124. A.L.F., Introducing the Animal Liberation Front, at http://www.animalliberation.net/
library/facts/alf.html.
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ation Frontline Information Service"'12 5 website which serves as a
clearinghouse for information on the actions of the A.L.F. The site
explains the structure of the A.L.F., or lack thereof, as "small autono-
mous groups of people all over the world who carry out direct action
according to the A.L.F. guidelines." 116
B. The Amorphous Nature of the Animal Rights Movement Makes
RICO Liability Inappropriate
The RICO suits against animal rights activists seem to be, in effect,
attempts to sue the A.L.F. for damages stemming from illegal vandalism
activity. Since the identities of the A.L.F. members are not known,
however, the plaintiffs have chosen to scapegoat the nearest available
target-the activists who openly protest their facilities each week.2 7 In
addition to providing a scapegoat, this approach carries an added benefit
for industry, namely the potential to dissuade activists from participating
in the political speech that industry finds bothersome and that harms
businesses by persuading the public to boycott animal-derived merchan-
dise and services. Essentially, the plaintiffs' allegations of racketeering
activity center on two types of illegal actions. The first type is illegal
civil disobedience which is open and defiant, and for which activists are
arrested on the spot. All three suits discussed infra allege that sit-in
activity contributed to their loss of business and entitles them to dam-
ages. '28 The second type of activity for which the furriers seek redress
is illegal vandalism by unknown perpetrators. It is the latter type that
125. The A.L.F. states its guidelines are:
(1) To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur
farms, etc., and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural
lives, free from suffering, (2) To inflict economic damage to those who profit from
the misery and exploitation of animals, (3) To reveal the horror and atrocities
committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent direct
actions and liberations, (4) To take all necessary precautions against harming any
animal, human and non-human. Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans
and who carry out actions according to A.L.F. Guidelines have the right to regard
themselves as part of the A.L.F. The Animal Liberation Front consists of small
autonomous groups of people all over the world who carry out direct action
according to the A.L.F. guidelines.
A.L.F., Animal Liberation Front Guidelines, at http://www.animalliberation.net/library/facts/
guidelines.html.
126. Id.
127. It is important to note that activists have also been known to protest at the homes of the
directors of their targeted business and that these protests have been dubbed "terrorism" by the
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Press Release, Huntingdon Life Science, Huntingdon Sues Animal Activists
(Apr. 19, 2001), at http://www.furcommission.com/news/newsF02t.htm.
128. See Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman, No. 99-CV-2277 (E.D. Pa. filed May 5, 1999);
Winters Fur Shoppe, Inc. v. Fullmer, No. 99-CV-3583 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 15, 1999); Press
Release, Huntingdon Life Sciences, Huntingdon Sues Animal Activists (Apr. 19, 2001), at http://
www.furcommission.com/newsF02T.htm.
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makes these cases factually similar to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co. 1
2 9
C. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Affirms the Freedom
of Association
In March of 1966, black residents of Claiborne County, Mississippi
presented their local government officials with a list of nineteen
demands for racial equality and integration.130 The demands included
desegregation of the public schools and facilities, inclusion of blacks in
the jury pool, integration of bus stations, and an end to verbal abuse by
police officers.' 3' A back-up plan was drawn up when, as predicted, the
white elected officials were unresponsive to the demands.' 32 Several
hundred black attendees of a local meeting of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) voted unanimously to
initiate a boycott of local white merchants. 33
One feature of the boycott was the presence of persons known as
"black hats"' 34 outside white businesses to keep track of any black
patrons who violated the boycott. In public speeches, defendant Charles
Evers, Field Secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi, warned that boy-
cott violators would be "disciplined" and reminded them that the sheriff
could not sleep with violators at night. 35 Evers was alleged to have said
in an unrecorded speech, "If we catch any of you going into them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."'136 The "black hats"
recorded the names of black community members who continued to do
business with white merchants. 137 The names were read at NAACP
meetings and published in the "Black Times" for purposes of ostracizing
boycott violators.138 In addition, in at least ten instances, acts of vio-
lence were visited upon the violators in the form of gunshots fired into
homes, a brick thrown through a windshield, destruction of a flower gar-
den, and at least one physical attack.' 39
Alongside this illegal activity was the widespread withholding of
business from white merchants and occasional peaceful picketing and
129. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
130. Id. at 889.
131. Id. at 899.
132. Id. at 889.
133. Id.
134. They were also called "deacons," "enforcers," or "store watchers." Id. at 894.
135. Id. at 902.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 903-04.
138. Id. at 904.
139. Id. at 904-07.
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marches in support of the boycott. 14 0 In writing the unanimous opinion,
Justice Stevens outlined the elements of the boycott that were entitled to
protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4' The boycott
participants' speeches and picketing were found to be wholly protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 42 The Court recognized the
value of collective action, stating, "[e]ffective advocacy of both public
and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recog-
nized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly."'' 43
Other elements of the boycott were also found to be safeguarded by
the First Amendment. The Court found that speech, which was directed
toward inducing prospective customers not to patronize a business, was
entitled to constitutional protection.'" Further, the publishing of the
names of boycott violators in a local paper was protected speech, which
did not become unprotected "merely because it may [have] embar-
rass[ed] others or coerce[d] them into action."' 45 Perhaps most surpris-
ingly, the Court found that the presence of the "black hats" was
protected. "There is nothing unlawful in standing outside a store and
recording names," the Court explained, nor is there anything unlawful in
wearing black hats. 4 6
While finding that much of the boycott was protected by the First
Amendment, the Court noted that "the First Amendment does not pro-
tect violence" and that "there is no question that acts of violence
occurred."' 4 7 When violence occurs in the context of constitutionally
protected speech, "precision of regulation is demanded."' 4 8 Without
such precision, "there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legiti-
mate aims of . .. an organization, but not specifically intending to
accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adher-
ence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes, because of other
and unprotected purposes which he does not necessarily share."' 49
The Court concluded that the imposition of civil liability could only
be imposed for mere association if the group was found to possess
unlawful goals, and if the individuals held a specific intent to further
140. Id. at 903.
141. Id. at 907.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
144. Id. at 909 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
145. Id. at 909.
146. Id. at 925.
147. Id. at 916.
148. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 n.52 (1963)).
149. Id. at 916 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)).
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those illegal aims. Finding that the participants in the boycott possessed
the lawful aims of challenging "a political and economic system that had
denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country had
fought a Civil War to secure," the Court held that the lower court's find-
ing of liability for economic damage from the boycott was improper."15
D. NOW v. Scheidler Did Not Overrule Claiborne Hardware: RICO
is Now a Seductive Means Toward Impermissible Ends
The defendants in NOW v. Scheidler made a critical mistake which
has led to the present controversy. That mistake was their failure to
properly raise a First Amendment challenge to the plaintiffs' use of
RICO.15' Instead of focusing on speech and association rights, they
focused their energies on attempting to rein in the runaway RICO stat-
ute, which one federal appellate judge described as "the monster that ate
jurisprudence." '52 Of course, it was not unwise for the defendants to
incorporate the overbreadth argument in their defense since the argu-
ment has broad appeal and countless supporters. 153 Their mistake was to
rely on this argument exclusively and to forego the opportunity to make
a First Amendment argument. In choosing this strategy, the Scheidler
defendants forfeited the opportunity to safeguard protesters from RICO
liability for illegal acts perpetrated by a minority of movement adher-
ents, and to expand the holding of Claiborne Hardware to protect par-
ticipants in civil disobedience from owing treble damages under RICO.
Since the Supreme Court remanded the case in 1994, NOW v.
Scheidler has continued to attract the attention of observers. On April
22, 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a second appeal
in the case.154 Oral argument is expected to take place in the fall of
2002. 155 The Court also granted a request from PETA to file a brief in
the case.' 5 6 The Court also expressly declined to hear the abortion
protestors' free speech claims. 157
150. Id. at 918, 921.
151. NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 n.6 (1994).
152. Theodore B. Olson, RICO is Worst Possible Way to Handle Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2000, at 5. The judge referred to is Judge David B. Sentelle of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. See also Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and
Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1990).
153. See, e.g., Geoffrey Aronow, In Defense of Sausage Reform: Legislative Changes to Civil
RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 964 (1990); Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled
Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050 (1990).
154. Michael Kirkland, Court Takes Landmark Abortion Protest Case, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2002.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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It appears that the onus of defending the First Amendment from the
sweeping reach of RICO now falls upon the shoulders of the animal
rights movement. It will be up to these defendants to demonstrate that
our nation's long history of protecting demonstration and political pro-
test "'58 demand "precision of regulation," 159 especially in the face of
RICO's tradition of liberal interpretation.
This showdown between RICO and the First Amendment may be
avoided if Congress heeds the common cry to safeguard groups whose
primary purpose is exchange in the marketplace of ideas from RICO
liability.' 60 Prompt Congressional action would avoid further harass-
ment of cash-poor social protest groups and individual activists by mon-
ied industry with appallingly low regard for the value of First
Amendment expression.' 6 '
JAIME I. ROTH*
158. Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DuKE L.J. 819, 847
n.171 (1996) (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
159. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 916 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 n.52 (1963)).
160. Parker, supra note 158, at 848. Congressional reform of RICO is periodically proposed,
and has been proposed at least three times in the past twelve years, but has never succeeded. Id. at
848 n.2 (citing H.R. 3522, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1989)); Bill to Limit RICO Fails to Reach Floor,
47 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 292, 292-93 (1991); Attempts to Limit RICO Fails Again, 46 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 536, 536-38 (1990)).
161. 39 Arrested in Protest, FUR AGE WEEKLY, Aug., 14, 1995, at 9 (discussing need for
aggressive response to animal rights protestors, and indicating the possibility that tactics used
against Operation Rescue might be adaptable to animal rights protesters). Both Winters Fur
Shoppe, Inc. v. Fullmer and Jacques Ferber, Inc. v. Bateman are currently in civil suspense, after
both groups of activists agreed to stipulate that they would not engage in illegal or harassing
behavior, including civil disobedience, at any of plaintiffs' places of busniesss. Since those
stipulations were filed, however, numerous acts of vandalism, mostly the breaking of display
windows, have been visited upon plaintiffs' stores by unknown perpetrators. The named
defendants have received at least three letters of intent from plaintiffs to reinstate the complaints,
but thus far, to the defendants' knowledge, no further legal action has been taken. Telephone
Interview with Joseph Bateman, supra note 101. The effect of these stipulations emphasizes the
need for Congressional action. Activists are currently forced to choose between capitulating to
their targeted industry's demands or continuing aggressive litigation, while potentially harming
their ability to prevail in court if they choose to continue to engage in civil disobedience. The
Huntingdon Life Sciences case is still in active litigation. The parties submitted to a court-ordered
settlement conference on October 2, 2001 in which Stephens, Inc., Huntingdon's major investor
and a plaintiff in the suit, offered to settle if SHAC USA (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty)
agreed to the company's restrictions on how it would like the activists' campaign to be run. Legal
Update, SHAC USA NEWSLETrER (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Phila., PA), Winter
2001, at 11. SHAC USA refused the offer and continues its active campaign against Huntingdon
Life Sciences. Id.
* The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor John Hart Ely for his insight in
the preparation of this Comment. A special word of thanks goes to all those working toward a
gentler world for animals, human and non.
